Center for Environmental Economics - Montpellier - Next events feed

CEE-M Seminar : Theory and Long Term Play in Experimental Economics

Thu, 21 May 2026 11:00:00 +0200

Speaker: David Levine
Address: Université Montpellier, salle C319. – Faculté d’économie, 195 Rue Vendémiaire, Montpellier

I examine quantitative theories that make clear predictions about > long-term play in the laboratory based solely on the experimental instructions and information about the population. Such theories, even if they are correct only some of the time, enables us to cumulate knowledge about human behavior rather than having a series of disconnected results and theories. I refer to such theories as benchmark theories. I show that psychological theories with hard-wired social preferences fare poorly, while welfare maximization that allows for both noisy play and willingness to sacrifice for the common good does relatively well.

Workshop : Workshop LOBBIES : the Economic Role of LOBBIES

Thu, 21 May 2026 00:00:00 +0200

Address: CEE-M, Université Montpellier – Faculté d’économie, Amphi C003, 195 Rue Vendémiaire, 34000 Montpellier, France

Workshop organized as part of the ANR Lobbies project: Industries and Lobbies: Obstacles or Drivers of the Energy Transition. This project is led by the CEE-M, the Paris School of Economics (PSE), the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), and the Center for Industrial Economics (CERNA), and is coordinated by Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (PSE). The workshop will take place at the Faculty of Economics, Av. Raymond Dugrand – Richter Campus, Lecture Hall C003. Standard presentations (35-minute presentations followed by 10 minutes of discussion) and blitz presentations (20-minute presentations with limited time for questions) will alternate to address the issues studied within the framework of this research project. Program : Thursday, May 21 08h30 – 09h00 Welcome 09h00 – 10h30 Plenary session 1 Marco Catola (Univ. of Pisa) and Cecilia Vergari (Univ. of Pisa) “Lobbying as an Entry Barrier” (Standard presentation) Benjamin Leffel (Univ. Nevada, Las Vegas) and Thomas Lyon (Univ. Michigan–Ann Arbor) “Dirty Opposition, Clean Support in Global Corporate Climate Lobbying” (Standard presentation) 10h30 – 11h00 Coffee 11h00 – 12h30 Plenary session 2 Liam Lods (Toulouse School of Economics) and David Martimort (Toulouse School of Economics) “Regulating the Stakeholders’ Firm” (Standard presentation) Houda Hafidi (Aix-Marseille School of Economics) “Climate Lobbying and Green Voting in the European Parliament: Evidence from Roll-Call Votes” (Standard presentation) 12h30 – 14h30 Lunch 14h30 – 16h00 Plenary session 3 Yann Bramoullé (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), Charles Figuières (Aix-Marseille School of Economics) and Mathis Preti (Aix-Marseille School of Economics) “Diversion Research” (Standard presentation) Patrick González (Univ. Laval) « A Contest of Beliefs: Lobbying with Endogenous Information » (Blitz presentation) Pierre Fleckinger (Mines Paris – PSL Univ.), Matthieu Glachant (Mines Paris – PSL Univ.) and Aude Pommeret (Univ. Savoie Mont Blanc) “The economics of greenhushing” (Blitz presentation) 16h00 – 16h30 Coffee 16h30 – 18h00 Plenary session 4 Olivier Beaumais (Univ. Rouen), Dorothée Charlier (Univ. Savoie Mont-Blanc), Olivier Gergaud (KEDGE Business School) and Rosanne Logeart (Paris School of Economics) » Generative AI and the Environment: Perceptions, Trust and Behavior of the French” (Standard presentation) Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (Paris School of Economics) and Thomas Lyon (Univ. Michigan–Ann Arbor) “Understanding the Links between CSR and Corporate Lobbying” (Standard presentation) 20h00 – 22h00 Dinner Friday, May 22 09h00 – 10h30 Plenary session 5 Dorothée Brécard (Univ. Toulon) « Green skepticism, competition, and welfare in vertically differentiated markets” (Standard presentation) Guillaume Cheikbossian (Univ. Montpellier) and Miao Dai (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute) « Indirect and direct lobbying on international trade in waste » (Standard presentation) 10h30 – 11h00 Coffee 11h00 – 12h30 Plenary session 6 Rick Harbaugh Indiana Univ. Bloomington), Thomas Lyon (Univ. Michigan–Ann Arbor) and John Maxwell (Indiana Univ. Kelley School of Business) “Electoral Competition, Polarization, and the Limits of Outside Lobbying: A Cheap Talk Approach” (Standard presentation) Philippe Bontems (Toulouse School of Economics) and David Martimort (Toulouse School of Economics) “Climate Agreements for Sale” (Blitz presentation) Mouez Fodha (Paris School of Economics), Fabien Prieur (Univ. Montpellier) and Francesco Ricci (Univ. Montpellier) « To Recycle or not to Recycle, that is the Question » (Blitz presentation) 12h30 – 14h30 Lunch 14h30 – 15h45 Plenary session 7 Fabien Prieur (Univ. Montpellier) “Strategic fossil expansion and the timing of the energy transition” (Standard presentation) Dorothée Brécard (Univ. Toulon) and Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (Paris School of Economics) « Blocking Green:[...]

BEE Seminar : Social Identity and Selection Neglect

Thu, 28 May 2026 11:00:00 +0200

Speaker: Eugenio Verrina
Address: UMR CEE-M Université Montpellier - Faculté d'économie 195 Rue Vendémiaire, 34960 Montpellier

Selection neglect, i.e., the failure to account for selection in the information one receives, is one of the key drivers behind political polarization. Social identity is often embedded in information structure where selection neglect may arise. For example, relying on information coming from one’s echo chamber and neglecting information outside of it may lead to distorted views. In this context, people belonging to one’s echo chamber could be viewed as in-group members, e.g., because they share one’s political affiliation, while people who do not belong to one’s echo chamber could be perceived as out-group members. In this study, we investigate how social identity and selection neglect together affect belief formation. We design a novel experimental paradigm where subjects guess a computer-generated number. For each guess, receivers observe the estimate of multiple senders who have privately received signals about the correct number. We manipulate i) whether the signal structure can induce selection neglect, and ii) whether social identity is present. We find that receivers suffer from selection neglect, replicating the results from previous studies. Importantly, selection neglect is exacerbated when the observed signals predominantly come from in-group senders. In contrast, if the observed signals come from out-group senders, subjects become much better at accounting for selection. Moreover, we show that social identity alone causes no bias, but it is the combination of selection neglect and social identity that drives our results. Finally, we dig into the potential mechanisms that could drive our results. Our findings offer insights into the determinants of polarization and have important implications for the design of information structure and of policies aimed at reducing it.

EE Seminar : Real estate markets, disaster insurance and environmental risks in France

Fri, 29 May 2026 11:00:00 +0200

Speaker: Lilian Rebai
Address: UMR CEE-M Institut Agro de Montpellier / INRAE - Bat. 26 - Centre de documentation Pierre Bartoli 2 Place Viala 34000 Montpellier

As climate risk intensifies, governments increasingly subsidize home insurance against natural hazards. While this policy lowers premiums for high-risk households and maintains broad insurance coverage, it may also distort location choices and raise exposure in hazardous areas. In this paper, I study this trade-off in the context of the French coastal real estate market. I document that home insurance premiums are effectively uncorrelated with environmental risk, creating weak price signals for households about the cost of exposure. Consistent with this muted incentive, cross-sectional regressions and staggered difference-in-differences around the official disclosure of environmental risk maps reveal no price penalty for exposure. To assess the broader consequences for household sorting, construction patterns, and aggregate value-at-risk, I develop a spatial equilibrium model of housing demand and supply featuring disaster risk, land-use regulation, and flat insurance pricing. Counterfactual simulations examine how introducing risk-based premiums would affect housing-market outcomes, welfare, and the long-term sustainability of the French system.

CEE-M Seminar : [Tarikua Erda : to be announced]

Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:00:00 +0200

Speaker: Tarikua Erda
Address: UMR CEE-M Institut Agro de Montpellier / INRAE - Bat. 26 - Centre de documentation Pierre Bartoli 2 Place Viala 34000 Montpellier