Abstract

Wine producers use fungicides as self-insuranceto secure their yields, generating well-known externalities on health and the environment. With green insurance, insured producers could receive a payment when less-pesticide intensive management practices result in yield loss compared to conventional farming. While it could be more cost-effective than fixed agri-environmental payment to incentivize the reduction of pesticide use, such instruments have not yet been included in the EU pesticide policy toolbox and are not available on the market for wine growers. Using a Discrete Choice Experiment, we investigate the determinants of the uptake by French wine growers of such a green insurance designed to reduce fungicide use. French winegrowers are overall interested in such a scheme, in particular those with less intensive treatments practices. We find low interest for group contracts and index-based insurance. We measure potential impact in terms of pesticide reduction and provide insights on the need (or not) to subsidize such conditional green insurance contracts within the framework of the agri-environmental policy.

Practical information